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Where a mortgagee, under the terms of his mortgage, took out an insurance
on the mortgaged property, in the name of the two mortgagors, and containing a
clause that additional insurance, obtained by the insured should avoid this
policy, unless the original insurer's consent be written on the original policy,
one of the mortgagors cannot take an additional policy in his own name; the
interests covered by the policies are identical, and the latter policy transgresses the condition of the former policy and avoids it.
If the policy had been in the name of the mortgagee, the difference in the
person insured would have been radical and controlling, and the additional
insurance obtained by mortgagor would not have avoided the former policy.

from the Circuit Court of Marathon County.
Plaintiff held a mortgage on certain real estate of M. A.
York & Co., a firm consisting of Mrs. M. A. York and her
husband, Solomon. The mortgage was given by that firm
to secure an indebtedness of $2000, which still remains unpaid. The principal value of the mortgaged premises was in
a saw-mill situated thereon, and certain machinery and
fixtures therein. This mortgage contained a covenant by the
mortgagors to keep the buildings on the mortgaged premises
insured for at least $2500, and tb assign the policies to the
APPEAL

plaintiff as collateral security for the mortgage debt, and, in
default thereof, the plaintiff was authorized to effect such in-

surance, the costs and expenses of which to be added to and
become a part of the mortgage debt. The mortgagors having
failed to obtain such insurap/.e, the plaintiff, on September 7,
1883, procured from the defendant company the policy in
suit. This policy insured M. A. York & Co. against loss of
the insured property or damage thereto by fire, for one year,
in the sum of $1000. It contained a stipulation that the same
should be void "if the insured shall have, or shall hereafter
make, any other insurance on the property hereby insured, or
any part thereof, without the consent of the company written
hereon." It permitted $2000 total concurrent insurance, and
provided, "loss, if any, under this policy, payable to J.
D. Gillett, Esq., as his interest may appear." In March,
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1884, Mrs. York, without the consent of the defendant company, procured fuither insurance on substantially the same
property, in several other insurance companies, amounting in
the aggregate to $4000. August 16, 1884, the insured property
was destroyed by fire. In November, 1884, plaintiff furnished
defendant company with proofs of such loss, in which such
insurance of $4000, obtained by Mrs. York, was stated. The
defendant refused to pay the insurance written in the policy,
and the plaintiff brought this action to recover it. The foregoing facts were conclusively established by the pleadings and
the testimony on the trial, to which further reference is made
in the opinion. The circuit judge directed the jury to return
a verdict for the defendant, which they accordingly did. A
motion for a new trial was denied, and judgment entered
for the defendant pursuant to the verdict. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment.
Silverthorn, Harley & Ryan, for appellant.
Cate, Jones, & Sanborn, for appellee.
LYoN, J. Dec. 22, 1888. (After stating the facts as above.)
To strengthen his security for the mortgage debt by an insurance upon the mortgaged property, two methods were open
to the plaintiff. He might have taken a policy directly to
himself, insuring his mortgage interest alone, if he could find
an insurer willing to issue such a policy; or he could obtain
a policy running to the mortgagors, stipulating that the loss,
if any, should be paid to him as his interest should appear.
Perhaps such a policy would not be an insurance of the mortgage interest, as such, but probably would cover such interest.
Either mode would protect the plaintiff's security under his
mortgage, but with this diffirence: had the policy run to
himself alone, insuring only his mortgage interest, it would
not be defeated by an unauthorized insurance upon the same
property, obtained by the mortgagors, while a policy running
to the Tnortgagors, insuring the property generally (as in
the present case), would be defeated by such unauthorized
insurance.
The plaintiff did not stipulate with the agent of the defendant company, Mr. Huntington, for a policy to himself,
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insuring only his mortgage interest. The only testimony on
the subject was given by the plaintiff himself, and is as follows: "I applied to Mr. Huntington for the insurance on
this property after the mortgage was executed. I received
this policy upon the application." In answer to the question
by his own counsel, "At. the time when you applied to Mr.
Huntington for this insurance did you state to him what
interest you had in the property?" he further testified: "I
think.I did tell him that I had a mortgage on the property,
and wanted- to insure my interest in it." He further testified that he paid the premium for such insurance. Thus, it
is undisputed that the plaintiff applied for an insurance upon
the mortgaged property to secure his interest therein under
his mortgage, without any agreement or reservation as to its
form or the stipulations it should contain. The agent issued
the policy in suit upon such application, which gives the
plaintiff the security he desired. The plaintiff accepted it as
a compliance with his application, and held it nearly a year
before the property was burned, without making any objection
that it did not comply with the original parol contract for
the insurance. We think it too late for the plaintiff to be
now heard to allege that the policy does not contain the
terms of the contract of insurance which the parties made,
even did the testimony tend to show (which it does not), that
a parol agreement was in fact made to the effect that the
policy should issue to the plaintiff, insuring the mortgage
interest alone.
Much weight is given to the argument of counsel for the
plaintiff to the fact that th- plaintiff paid the premium for
the insurance. But this fact must be considered in connection with the covenant in the mortgage that the mortgagors
should insure the property, and, failing to do so, that the
plaintiff might insure the same, and that the expense thereof
should be added to and constitute a part of the mortgage
debt. So, when the plaintiff says he paid the premium for
the insurance, the effect of his testimony is that he thereby
increased the mortgage debt by the sum so paid. Moreover,
the above covenant clearly contemplates an insurance of the
mortgagors' interest in the property, which could only be
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effected by a policy running to them. The covenant is
ample authority to the plaintiff to insure the property in their
names.
Having thus determined that the plaintiff is bound by the
stipulations in the policy in suit, it necessarily results that the
obtaining by the mortgagors of any unauthorized insurance
on the same property invalidates the policy, under the stipulation therein against additional insurance without the consent of the defendant company. Has this stipulation been
violated? Mrs. York, one of the owners of the property,
obtained policies in her name alone in Miarch, 1884, on substantially the same property, for $4000, without the consent
or knowledge of the defendant company. Nothing appears
adverse to the validity of such additional insurance. The
policy in suit permitted concurrent insurance to the amount of
$2000 only. Had this insurance been effected by M. A. York
& Co., it would doubtless have defeated the policy. It may
be conceded that these policies for 84000 insured only the
interest of Mrs. York in the insured property, which, presumably, is one-half thereof.
It is maintained by counsel for plaintiff that, because the
policies were obtained by and issued to Mrs. York alone, the
$4000 insurance is not a breach of the stipulation against
other insurance. The rule invoked to support this proposition is thus laid down in 2 Wood on Ins. § 377: "In order
to amount to other insurance, the interests covered by the
policies must be identical." We think such interests are
identical in the present case. The policy in suit insures the
interest of Mrs. York in the insured property, and the additional policies issued to her insure the same interest. We
find no established rule that because Solomon York's interest
in the property was insured by the policy in suit, and not by
the $4000 policies, the latter policies do not constitute double
insurance. In Insurance Co. v. luiran (1879), 92 Ill. 145, it
was held that any unauthorized insurance by a wife, violated
a stipulation in a former policy on the same property, issued
to her and her husband. Such we think the law. Several
distinctions between the Illinois case and the one under consideration are noted by counsel, some of which are real and
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some are not, but we think these do not affect the applicability of the rule, there laid down, to this case. The case of
Insurance Co. v. Foster (1878), 90 Ill. 121, is relied upon as
holding a :different rule. The case is this: Foster held a
mortgage on certain property, executed by B. He obtained
an insurance upon the property, paid the premium, and,
without the knowledge or authority of B., took a policy in
their joint names; the policy containing the usual stipulation
as regards other insurance. B. had obtained another insurance in violation of the stipulation. The Court held that,
under the circumstances, the insurance was solely for F.'s
benefit, and that the policy was not itivalidated by such act
of B. The difference between the two cases is, the policy in
the Illinois case ran to Foster, the mortgagee, and, in legal
effect, as the Court held, to him alone, while here the policy
runs to the mortgagors alone. This difference is radical and
controlling, and calls for the application in this case of a different rule of law. Another case, much relied upon by
counsel for the plaintiff, may properly be noticed in this connection. It is that of Pitney v. Insurance Co. (1875), 65 N.
Y. 6. Norman and George N. Pitney were joint owners of
the insured property, which was a quantity of wool. Norman obtained a policy in his own name. Afterwards he told
the agent that be had forgotten to mention the interest of
George, and-his intention to have that interest insured. The
agent attempted to accomplish that purpose by inserting in
the policy these words: "In case of loss, if any, one-half payable to George N. Pitney, as his interest may appear."
Under the circumstances, it "was held that the interest of
George N. in the wool was covered by the policy. That case
does not hold that a breach of covenant against further insurance would not have resulted, had either of the owners of the
wool insured his interest therein in his own name without
the consent of the company. Hence the case is not in point
here. That case was decided by a bare majority of the commission of appeals: ILOTT, Ch. C., and EARL, C., dissenting.
We should hesitate to indorse all the doctrines there asserted
without further examination.
We conclude that the policy in suit was invalidated by the
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unauthorized insurance obtained by Mrs. York, and hence
that the Court properly directed a verdict for the defendant.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
It is unnecessary to cite authorities to the proposition, that a condition in a policy, prohibiting the insured from insuring the same property
in another company, or limiting the
amount of insurance which may be
obtained elsewhere, is valid. And it
is equally well settled, that a subsequent insurer may relieve itself from
liability, by a stipulation in its policy,
if there is existing insurance, which
is not disclosed and assented to.
Rule of construction.-Conditions in
contracts which provide for a forfeiture, are not looked upon with favor,
especially when there has been a performance by one of the parties. But
the same degree of jealousy is not entertained by all the Courts, of the
condition prohibiting other insurance,
as of most of the conditions which
make the modern insurance policy
such a prolix and complicated instrument. This distinction rests on the
ground that the condition is a reasonable one, a protection against fraud,
and in support of a sound public
policy: Turner v. Meridian Co. (1883),
U. S. C. Ct., D. R. I., 16 Fed. Repr.
454. Being a known part of the contract, the condition will receive a fair
and reasonable interpretation, according to the terms and obvious import
of the language used: Carpenter v.
PRovidence Co. (1842), 16 Pet. (41 U.
S.) 495, 512. A precisely literal or
inflexibly stringent interpretation
against the insurer, would often be
inconsistent with public policy, reason and justice, and not required by
the wise maxim that ambiguities
should be construed most strongly
against the party who framed the instrument in which they are used:

Mlanhattan Co. v. Stein (1869), 5 Bush
(Ky.), 652. But it will fully appear
in the course of this note, that this
view is not satisfactory to some Courts.
For the present, let it suffice to observe
that the rule stated, does not apply if
there is any uncertainty in the language used. Ambiguous stipulations,
prohibiting other insurance, are restrictions on the right of the insured
to redress against the insurer. They
impose a burden on the insured, for
the insurer's benefit, and must therefore be strictly construed: Wanick v.
Meonmouth County Mut. Co. (1882), 44
N. J. L. 83. The common-law rule of
strict construction in regard to forfeiture, Is wholesome and sound.
"Parties may contract very much as
they choose, so long as they keep
within the law; and it may be assumed there is some reason for each
condition adopted. But there is great
hardship, in allowing parties to keep
money which they have not fairly
earned, and great wrong, in favoring
blind conditions, or those which par.
ties do not fully understand, where
they are not in actual fault. A close
construction is the only just one:"
Westchester Co. v. Earle (1876), 33
Mich. 143.
A condition in a policy, limiting the
amount for which the defendant should
be liable, expressed that every person
"insuring," was required to give notice of any other insurance "effected."
This was held to include subsequent,
as well as prior insurance : Warwick v.
Monmouth County Mut. Co., supra. A
requirement that notice shall be given
"of any insurance made," applies to
subsequent as well as prior insurance.
The judge who wrote the opinion in
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this case indicated that his conviction was otherwise; the ruling was
made in deference to authority, it
having been so held in Harrisv. Ohio
Co. (1832), 5 Ohio, 466; ,Stacey v.
Franklin Co. (1841), 2 W. & S. (Pa.),
506, 547. It was expressed that the
policy "shall become void, if any
other insurance be made, which, together with this insurance, shall exceed," etc. This related to subsequent insurance only: Mussey v. Atlas Co. (1856), 14 N. Y. 79. The other
insurance contemplated by the usual
condition, is insurance effected in another company, after the policy issued,
or if previously existing, not then
known to the insured. Insurance
which is disclosed by the application
is not within the reason of the condition : Lockwood v. Middlesex Mut. Co.
(1880), 47 Conn. 553.
Plaintiff warranted that his title to
the property insured was derived from
a contract, and in reply to the question, "how much insured in other
companies ?" answered "none." This
was interpreted to mean that plaintiff
had no insurance in other companies.
The question was not meant to elicit
information concerning insurance by
another, as plaintiffs vendor: Sprague
v. Holland P. Co. (1877), 69 N. Y.
128.
Who is the insured?-The policy was
to the owner of the property, and prol
hibited other insurance "on the interest hereby insured." The property
was seized at the instance of creditors, and the officer who had the custody of it, insured it for their benefit.
The insurance so effected, was not
prohibited: Harignyv. Home Mut. Co.
(1858), 13 La. An. 338. A warranty
of no other insurance, made by the
consignor of a vessel, who had obtained insurance on its freight, is not
broken because the consignee, who has
accepted a draft against such freight,

without the knowledge of the consignor, makes an insurance thereon:
Williamsv. Crescent Mt. Co. (1860),
15 La. An. 65.
A policy to a mortgagor, contained
authority for an assignment of it to a
person named, who was in fact mortgagee of the property, but was not so
described. The mortgagor obtained
another policy subsequently, which
was to be void, if prior insurance existed by the insured on the property
thereby insured. The first policy was
never in fact assigned, but this was
considered immaterial, and it was
ruled that it covered the interest of
the mortgagor, and the second policy,
not containing the required consent,
was void: Carpenter v. Providence Co.,
supra. A policy to mortgagors, the
loss being payable to their mortgagee,
insures the former only, and a subsequent policy, obtained contrary to
its conditions, by one of the mortgagors, avoids it: ContinentalCo. v. Hulman (1879), 92 Ill. 145; Friemansdorf
v. Watertown Co. (1879), 9 Biss. U. S.
C. Ct., N. D. Ill. 167; Lias v. Roger
Williams Co. (1880), U. S. C. Ct. D.
N. H. ; 8 Fed. Repr. 187.
An equitable mortgagor, who insures the whole property under authority from the mortgagee, is within
the condition, prohibiting other insurance by the insured. The Court observed: It is the thing, and not any
particular form of doing it, which is
guarded against, and that thing is
such subsequent insurance on the property as would lessen the interest of
the insured in its preservation; and
this includes all subsequent insurance
which, when recovered, will go to the
benefit of the insured in the first
policy. And so, if the mortgagee
did in fact, cover his own special interest as mortgagee, and the mortgagor agreed to pay the expense of obtaining the insurance, then, although
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the mortgagee would have a lien on
the insurance money as security for
his debt, yet the mortgagor could
compel its application to the payment of his debt, and any surplus
would belong to him. Hence subsequent insurance obtained by the mortgagor, is effected by the insured: Holbrook v. American Co. (1852), 1 Curt.
(U. S. C. Ct.) 193, 201. And so a
policy to a mortgagor, assigned by
him to the mortgagee, is avoided by
one subsequently obtained by the
purchaser of the mortgagor's rights:
Moulthrop v. Farmers' M1ut. Co. (1879),
52 Vt. 123.
If there is no agreement between
the mortgagor and the mortgagee
whereby the former was to be interested in a policy obtained by the latter, a previous policy to the mortgagor
is not avoided by one in the mortgagee's favor: Guest v. New Hampshire
Co., Sup. Ct. Mich., 1887. A policy
obtained by a mortgagee in favor of
the mortgagor, without the knowledge
of the latter, does not avoid one procured by the mortgagor, without notice to the insurer of the former :
Nichols v. Fayette Mut. Co.'(1861), 1
Allen (Mass.) 63. Insurance upon a
mortgagor's interest does not defeat a
subsequent policy on the same property, in favor of the mortgagee and
the mortgagor, the loss being payable
to the former, and the latter not being
aware of the existence of the second
policy: Westchester Co. v. Foster
(1878), 90 Ill. 121. If the mortgagor's application for insurance notifies
the insurer that the property is mortgaged, and that the murtgagee has the
right to insure it to an amount
stated, and if,pursuant to such right,
without the mortgagor's knowledge,
the mortgagee obtains a policy, it is not
other insurance: Carpenter v. Continental Co. (1886), 61 Mich. 635.
A policy upon property, the legal

title to which was in the mortgagor's
assignee, was payable to the mortgagee. Without the consent of either of
these, the mortgagor insured the property in his own name as owner.
Suchpolicy did not affect the first one.
It was obtained by a stranger, on his
own interest, and could not be controlled or prevented by the mortgagee
nor the mortgagor's assignee: Wheeler
v. Watertown Co. (1881), 131 Mass. 1.
The insurance was for the benefit of
the mortgagee of the property, and the
policy contained the usual prohibition
against other insurance, but provided
that no sale or transfer of the property
insured should affect the mortgagee's
right. A second mortgage was exeouted ; after entering, for the purpose
of foreclosing, the second mortgagee
insured the property without the consent of the first insurer. This insurance did not affect the rights of the
first mortgagee: City Five Cent Bank
v. PennsylaniaCo. (1877), 122 Mass.
165.
The mortgagor was insured, the
loss being payable to the mortgagee:
Subsequently the mortgagee insured
the same property, without defendant's knowledge, the loss being payable to him. In reply to the point that
this constituted double insurance, the
Court observes: "The answer to this
is that the insured, the mortgagor, did
not procure the further insurance,
that he did not know ofit until after the
loss, and that the mortgagee was not
his agent, in any sense, to procure
such insurance. It is true that the
mortgage contained a clause, providing that the mortgagor should keep
the mortgaged buildings insured, and
assign the policy to the mortgagee,
and that in case of default onhis part,
the mortgagee might procure such
insurance at his expense, and add the
amount paid therefor to his mortgage.
But that clause could not operate until
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there was default on the part of the
mortgagor, and he could be put in default only upon refusal or neglect to
procure the insurance, after some sort
of notice or demand. Besides, the
mortgagee, in procuring that insurance, acted for himself and in his own
interest; and hence his act in procuring it, cannot be so far regarded as
the act of the mortgagor, as to violate
the prohibition against other insurance. The mortgagor did not ratify
the mortgagee's act, so as to be bound
by it, in making proof of the loss :"
Titus v. Glen's Falls Co. (1880), 81
N. Y. 410; Doran v. Franklin Co.
(1881), 86 Id. 635.
A policy to a mortgagee, as such, is
not affected by an insurance of the
mortgagor's interest, though it be for
the benefit of the mortgagee, if it was
procured without his knowledge or
request: Johnson v. North British Co.
(1872), 1 Holmes (U. S. C. Ct.) 117.
Other insurance by the insured or
his assigns, was prohibited. The prohibition did not extend to an absolute
purchaser of the property insured,
who did not become the assignee of
the policy according to its terms, nor
to one who acquired a lien thereon,
or other interest by way of mortgage:
Holbrook v. American Co., supra.
Property covered by a policy admitted to have been made on account of another than the insured, was assigned
in trust for the creditors of the party
beneficially interested. The trustees
named in the assignment, effected
other insurance without giving notice.
This avoided the first policy: Leavitt
v. Western Co. (1844), 7 Rob. (La.)
351.
A policy to tenants in common of
personal property is avoided by a subsequent one, to one of such tenants,
no mention being made of the joint
ownership: Rtney v. Glen's Falls Co.
(1875), 65 N. Y. 6; Harridge v. Dwel-

ling House Co., Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct.
1888. A part owner of a vessel has
no authority, by reason of such ownership, to insure the interests of his
co-owners; hence a policy uipon the
whole vessel taken by him in his
name, without previous authority or
subsequent ratification by the other
owners, is invalid, except as to the
interest of him who procured it:
Knight v. Eureka Co. (1875), 26 Ohio
St. 664. But a warranty against
other insurance is broken when part
of those who made it obtained such
insurance for their own benefit: Mfussey v. Atlas Co. (1856), 14 N. Y. 79.
The naked legal title, to the property insured, was in the trustee under a will. By the terms of the will
and a division of the estate, some of
the devisees had become entitled to an
undivided portion thereof. The interest of one of these was insured.
Subsequently the trustee, as such, and
without stating for whom, insured
the same property without the knowledge or consent of the person who
was already insured. Parol evidence
was received to show that the later
policy was intended to apply only to
the uninsured interest: Franklin Co.
v. Drake (1841), 2 B. Mon. (Ky ),47.
A policy obtained by a vendee, and
assigned to his vendor, pursuant to
their contract, avoids a policy subsequently obtained by the vendor for
his own benefit: Nere v. Columbia Co.
(1842), 2 M'Mull. (S. C.), 220. But
if the vendee is in possession of the
property, under a valid contract for
a deed, part of the purchase-money
being unpaid, a policy to the vendee is
not avoided by a previous one issued
to the vendor, no assignment of such
policy being made to the purchaser
before loss. The policy held by the
vendor protected his interest in the
property: ,tna Co. v. Tyler (1836),
16 Wend. (N. Y.) 385 ; affirming Tyler
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v..Etna Co., 12 Id. 507. Insurance
by a vendor does not constitute a
breach of warranty by his vendee,
that there is no insurance: Sprague
v. HollandP. Co., supra. An insured
stock of goods was mingled with
another insured stock, acquired by
purchase. The vendor's policy, with
the insurer's consent, was assigned
to the vendee, and the latter's policy
was changed to cover his original
stock in the place to which it was
removed. The vendee's policy was
W1ralton v. Louisiana Co.
avoided:
(1842), 2 Rob. (La.) 563; Washington
Co. v. Hayes (1867), 17 Ohio St. 432.
One to whom a policy is payable in
case of loss, and who has become,
with insurer's assent, the assignee of
the interest of the insured in the
policy, is only entitled to receive what
the insured could recover, and the
latter's act in procuring other insurance bars the assignee's right to recover : Hate v. Mfechanic's Mlut. Co.
(1856), 6 Gray (Mass.), 169.
What property is insured.-The words
"property hereby insured," refer to
the interest of the insured in the property: Johnson v. North British Co.
supra. Neither the policy of the law
nor the contract of insurance,
when such words as are quoted
are employed in the latter, forbids
as many several insurances upon
the same property as there are separate insurable interests. The policy
of the law is to prevent insurances in
excess of the value of the thing insured in favor of the same party and
against the same risks; and hence
the restrictive clause, whatever its
form, unless its language clearly demands a different interpretation,
should be held operative to this extent
only, and the term property, in such
clause, means the interest of the assured: Springfield Co. v. Allen (1871),
43 F. Y. 389.
VOL. XXXVII.-15

The owner of an insured mill
leased it for a term of years. While
in possession, the lessee took out part
of the old machinery and substituted
new in its place, at his own expense.
He insured such new machinery and
assigned the policy to the lessor as
security for a loan. The insurances
were upon different property: Planter's M3fut. Co. v. Rowland (1886), 66
Md. 236.
It was formerly held in New York,
where a specific parcel of property
was insured, and the same property
was covered by another policy, which
also included other property of the
same assured, that the latter was
to be thrown out of view, and did not
constitute other insurance: Howard
Co. v. Scribner (1843), 5 Hill (N. Y.),
298. This case was followed in Soat
v. Royal Co. (1865), 49 Pa. 14. The
first policy in the last case was on a
building, the second one was on the
same building, and the shafting, machinery, belting, etc., contained in it.
The insurance was held not to be
double. The contrary rule is now established in New York: Ogden v. East
Rirer Co. (1872), 50 N. Y. 388; and
in Ohio: Phnix Co. v. Michigan, etc.
R. R. Co. (1875), 28 Ohio St. 69.
No person, whose property was insured by defendant, was "allowed to
insure the same, or any property connected with it," elsewhere. The property covered by the policy was a
store building. It was ruled that the
stock in trade therein was not "connected" with the building: Jones v.
Maine Mut. Co. (1841), 18 Me. 155.
Insurance on such a stock is not contrary to a condition prohibiting other
insurance on any house or building:
Illinois 31ut. Co. v. O'Neile (1851), 13
Ill. 89.
A policy, covering a stock of goods,
divided the whole amount for which
it was written, into two classes, and
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provided that if the assured "shall
hereafter make any other insurance
on the hereby insured premises,"
without giving notice, it should be
void. This was taken to mean, that
if any part of the goods mentioned
was subsequently insured, the whole
policy should become void: Associated
1fremen's Co. v. Assum (1853), 5 Md.
165.
When is there other insurance?Where it is sought to enforce a forfeiture, because of a subsequent policy,
it must appear that such policy was
delivered, by the insurer to the insured, with the intention that it
should take effect as its contract, and
was accepted by him as a contract
then binding: Continental Co. v. Horton (1873), 28 Mich. 173.
If a policy is surrendered, the surrender to take effect at a time stated,
it is of no force after such time, though
it may not be discharged by the
company until a later day: Atlantic
Co. v. Goodall (1857), 35 N. H. 328;
Hadley v. New Hampshire Co. (1875),
55 Id. 110. If one who is insured surrenders a policy to an agent of the
company which issued it, such agent
having previously taken the surrender of policies and had them cancelled, his acts in this regard having
been approved by his principal, the
policy is of no force from the time it
is surrendered, although the company
declined to refay any part of the
premium, the agreement between the
agent and the insured not providing
for the return of any specific sum.
The subsequent taking of such policy
from the agent by the insured, after
a loss, did not revive it: Train v.
Holland P. Co. (1875), 62 N. Y. 598.
This case was again before the Court
on a different state of facts, and is reported (1877) in 68 N. Y. 208.
It was fully understood and agreed
that an existing policy should be can-

celled, if the one in suit was taken.
This understanding was carried into
effect by an act which, if not actually
before the manual reception of the
policy issued by defendant, was substantially contemporaneous. The cancellation was one of several steps
which were to be taken to complete
the second insurance, and whether
taken a few minutes or a few hours
before or after any other step necessary to effect a completed contract, was
immaterial, if all were taken substantially at the same time and before the
transaction was closed: Continental
Ins. Co. v. Horton (1873), 28 Mich. 173.
A broker obtained $15,000 insurance for the plaintiff, distributed in
a number of companies. Defendant's policy showed the total insurance, and prohibited in the usual
Subseterms, other insurance.
quently the agent of one of the companies gave such broker written
notice that its policy for $3000 was
cancelled. The broker then obtained
a policy for $1500 in another company. It did not appear that the
policy which was cancelled reserved
the power to the company which issued it to cancel it, or that there was
any agreement of the parties to that
effect, and plaintiff showed that he,
personally, never consented to the
cancellation, and no authority to do
so was shown to have been given the
broker. His agency to procure the
insurance implied no authority to terminate it. Hence it did not appear
but that the cancelled policy was a
valid and subsisting contract of insurance when the policy for $1500 was
obtained: Rothschildv. American C. Co.
(1881), 74 Mo. 41.
Defendant, in an action upon his
premium note, set up that when the
policy for which the note was given
was applied for, he had insurance in
another company, the fact concerning
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which was not endorsed on such
policy. The first was surrendered after the second was obtained. The evidence tended to show that it was
understood and agreed by the parties
to the second policy, that it was not
to be in effect until the first was surrendered, and" that neither of them
contemplated double insurance. The
defendant was held liable: Atlantic
Mut. Co. v. Goodall (1854), 9 Fost.
(N. H.) 182; s. c. (1857), 35 N. H.
328.
As intimated in the second paragraph of this note, there is a wide difference of opinion held as to the effect
to be allowed the usual clause prohibiting other insurance. This variance
of views grows out of the construction
given to the word "insurance."
What may be called the New England
view is, that the insurance contemplated by the first insurer is a contract which is valid, legal, and
enforceable, and that a subsequent
policy, payment of which cannot be
compelled, is not within the condition.
This was first held in Jackson v. MassachusettsMut. Co.(1839), 23Pick.(Mass.)
418. The doctrine is well established
in Massachusetts: Clark v. New England Co. (1850), 6 Cush. (Mass.) 342;
Hardy v. Union Mut. Co. (1862), 4
Allen (Mass.), 217; Wheeler v. Watertown Co. (1881), 131 Mass. 1;
Thomas v. Builders' Afut. Co. (1875),
119 Id. 121. It was declared in Pennsylvania in 1841: Stacey v. Franklin
Co., supra. 'In New Jersey in 1854:
Schenck v. Mercer County Mut. Co.
(1854), 24 N. J. L. 447; Jersey City
Co. v. Nichol (1882), 35 N. J. Eq. 291.
In Maine, by a dictum, in Philbrook v.
New England Mut. Co. (1853), 37 Me.
137; and fully in Lindley v. Union
Farmers'Mutual Co. (1876), 65 Id. 368.
In Ohio in Knight v. Eureka Co., supra.
In Virginia in Sutherland v. Old Do.
minion Co. (1878), 31 Grat. (Va.)
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176. In New Hampshire in Gale v.
Belknap County Co. (1860), 41 N. H.
170; Gee v. Cheshire County Afut. Co.
(1874), 55 Id. 65. By Judge DIL~oN
in Allison v. Phonix Co. (1873), 3 Dill.
(U. S. C. Ct. D. Iowa), 480.
An Indiana case (Rising Sun Co. v.
Slaughter (1863), 20 Ind. 520) is
usually cited as being in accord with
the cases referred to. The rule there
laid down is that a totally invalid insurance is not within the prohibition.
The case was ruled on the erroneous
assumption that, because the agent of
a foreign company had not complied
with the statute concerning such companies, its policy was utterly void.
The present rule in Indiana is stated
infra.
The validity of the subsequent policy is to be determined by the facts
which existed before the loss occurred. The prior insurer is not injuriously affected by what subsequently
transpired between the company
which issued the second policy and
the insured, although such company
paid the loss: Hardy v. Union Mut.
Co., supra; Thomas v. Builders' Mut.
Co., supra; Lindley v. Union Mut. Co.,
supra; Fireman's Co. v. Holt (1878),
35 Ohio St. 189.
If the policy which increased the
insurance beyond the amount covenanted to be taken by the insured in
a prior policy is void at the time of
loss, it does not constitute a breach of
the covenant; but if it is voidable
only by reason of the breach of a condition enabling the insurer to avoid
it, but which it has waived, there is a
breach: Mitchell v. Lycoming Mut. Co.
(1865), 51 Pa. 402. If the policy,
which was obtained contrary to the
conditions of another contract, was
not in force when the loss occurred,
the condition against other insurance
is not violated: N. E. F. - M. Co. v.
Schettler (1865), 38 Il1. 166; Ober-
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meyer v. Globe Mut. Co. (1869), 43 Mo.
573. In the last case the insured intended to meet the conditions of the
policy sued upon. He received notice
that one of his policies would be cancelled at a certain time, and procured
another of equal amount; the cancellation did not take effect until the one
so procured had been in force a month.
When the loss occurred such policy
had been discharged. A contract, entered into under a mutual mistake as
to the existence of other insurance,
does not avoid a prior policy, the
policy so contracted for never having
been delivered: Wilson v. Queen Co.
(1881), U. S. C. Ct. W. D. Pa., 5
Fed. Repr. 674. A policy may be cancelled without the consent of the company which has issued another
policy on the same property. The
insured is not bound to have a policy
declared invalid, before he may be relieved from liability for a forfeiture,
because he obtained other insurance:
Hand v. Williamsburgh Co. (1874), 57
N. Y. 41.
A condition providing for a forfeiture, whether other insurance, if taken,
be valid or not, is void, it seems, for
repugnance to the nature of the contract evidenced by the policy, because
it is against an attempt resulting in
total failure. A policy with such a
condition does not become immediately void upon obtaining another,
but subsists so as to render the latter
double insurance: Gee v. Cheshire
Mfut. Co., supra. But see infra.
The second policy contained a
printed condition that it should be
void if any other insurance was taken
on the property covered by it, and
was not indorsed. A written clause
in it was in these words: "Other insurances permitted without notice,
until required." Considered in connection with other provisions in the
policy, this writing was held applica-

ble to prior as well as to subsequent
insurance, and was not avoided by
prior insurance, but itself avoided a
policy existing when it issued, and
containing similar language: Kimball
v. Howard Co. (1857), 8 Gray (Mass.)
33.
The opposing view was first declared by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1842, when it was
ruled that a policy obtained by misrepresenting material facts, is not void
ab initio, but merely voidable, and may
be avoided by the company which issued it upon due proof of the facts;
but, until so avoided, it must be
treated for all practical purposes as a
subsisting polioy. Notice of it must be
given the other insurer: Carpenter v.
Thuvidence Co., supra. Referring to
the cases which declare otherwise,
the Court observes that they are
distinguishable
from this case.
Questions of this character are questions of general commercial law, and
depend upon construction, and are
not regulated by local policy or customs. Judge DiLLo-, was of the opinion that this case does not establish
that a second policy is to be considered in all respects valid, unless it
is avoided by the insurer before loss:
Allison v. Phaenix Co., supra. But
Judge COLT thinks otherwise: Turner
v. M eridian Co., supra.
In New York the rule that if the
invalidity of the second policy does
not appear on its face, it avoids the
prior one, was adopted in Bigler v.
New York C. Co. (1860), 22 N. Y. 402.
If a second policy is void ab initio, the
insured is not thereby relieved from
the forfeiture resulting from the violation of the stipulations contained in
the first. This is ruled on the ground
that, to hold a contract which has
been violated by only one of the
parties to it, void as to both, is to put
it in the power of either, after making
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it, to render it a nullity by simply violating some one of its conditions: Stevens v. Phonix Co. (1884), 83 Ky. 7;
Baer v. Phonix Co. (1868), 4 Bush
(Ky.), 242; Allen v. Merchants' Mut.
Co. (1878), 30 La. An. 1386.
If the clause, prohibiting other insurance, uses the words "whether
valid or not," all inquiry as to the validity of a subsequent policy is immaterial: ContinentalCo. v. Hulman (1879),
92111.145. The use of the words quoted
is an agreement that the validity or
invalidity of other insurance, taken
without consent, should not be the
subject of future contract. Such an
agreement is not against public policy,
nor is it prohibited by law. If the
prohibited policy, held or received by
the insured, is in and of itself invalid
and void, so that in fact it constitutes
no contract of insurance, it will not
affect the validity of another policy.
But if, to avoid it requires the production of facts extraneous to the
policy, it will avoid another policy:
Phoenix Co. v. Lamar (1886), 106 Ind.
513. Under such a condition, an invalid policy, obtained in good faith,
avoids a prior one: Sugg v. Hartfbrd
Co. (1887), 98 N. C. 143; Somerfield
v. State 'o. (1881), 8 Lea (Tenn.),
547. Contra: Stevens v. Citizens' Co.
(1886), 69 Iowa, 658.
When defendant issued its policy,
the property was already insured by a
policy which provided that it should
be void if other insurance was taken,
whether it was valid or not. The
same provision was in tile policy sued
upon. The first policy was not at once
invalidated on the issue of the second,
and the latter was itself void: Keyser
v. Hartford Co., Sup. Ct. lich., July,
1887.
Under the usual prohibitory clause,
the words "valid or invalid" being
absent, a policy, voidable at the election of the insurer, is a violation:

Landers v. Watertown Co. (1881), 86
N. Y. 414, reversing s. c. (1879), 19
Hun (N. Y.), 174; Emery v. Mutual
Co. (1883), 51 Mich. 469; Robinson v.
ire Ass'n (1886), 63 Id. 90; Turner
V. Meridian Co., supra; American Co.
v. Reploggel, Sup. Ct. Ind., March,
1888; Aquitable Co. v. McCrea (1881),
8 Lea (Tenn.), 541; Funke v. Minnesota Farmers' Mut. Co. (1882), 29
Minn. 347; Lackey v. Georgia, etc.
Co. (1871), 42 Ga. 456.
A forfeiture is not avoided because
the insured obtained other policies
without knowledge of the condition
forbidding it, and in good faith: Gee
v. Cheshire Hut. Co., sulna; Zinck v.
Pht ix Co. (1882), 60 Iowa, 266;
Allen v. Merchants' Mut. Co., supra;
Bonneville v. Western Co. (1887), 68
Wis. 298; Keyser v. Hartford Co.,
supra.
If the insured warranted his answers concerning the amount of his
insurance, and unintentionally misstated its amount, his good faith is
immaterial, though the insurer knew
the fact to be otherwise than as it
was stated: Commonwealth Mut. Co. v.
Huntzznger (1881), 98 Pa. 41.
A third view of the question under
consideration is taken in Iowa, where
it is held that the right to recover un,
der the prior policy, depends- upon the
act of the second insurer. If its policy
has been treated by it as valid, any
breach of the conditions therein being waived, the right of action upon
the prior policy is gone: Hubbard v.
Hartfbrd Co. (1871), 33 \Iowa, 325;
David v. Hartord Co. (1862), 13 Id.
69; Behrens v. Germania Co. (1884),
64 Id. 19.
As has been suggested, the New
England rule is largely rested upon
the construction given the word insurance. The opposing rule is supported on the theory that it is in
harmony with the intention of the

GILLETT v. LIVERPOOL AND L. & G. INS. CO.
parties and in furtherance of public
policy. The argument in support of
the latter and against the former view
is thus stated by the Minnesota Court:
"The plaintiff intended to secure indemnity by the second insurance, and
thereby removed from his mind all
motives of self-interest in the preservation of the property, so far as other
insurance could have that effect.
Whatever increased hazard other insurance could cause, was effected to
the full extent if insured supposed
the second policy valid and enforceable; and, in a less degree perhaps,
if he knew it to be void at the election
of the insurer, and that he could not
recover on it if the facts avoiding it
should be discovered. The Court
criticises the narrow construction
given the word insurance, and observes that it is not at all necessary,
from a consideration of the proper and
natural import of the word, and we
are unable to comprehend how it can
be regarded as expressing the agreement in the nilnds of the parties,
without disregarding what every one
must understand to have been the
The same
purpose contemplated.
construction would make a second insurance inoperative to terminate the
liability of a prior insurer, under the
usual conditions of a policy, if it
should appear after the loss had occurred that the second insurer had
been, from the time of making the
contract, insolvent. The word insurance, in common speech and with propriety, is used quite as often in the
sense of contract of insurance, or act
of insuring, as in that of expressing
the abstract idea of indemnity or security against loss. In that sense the
word was used in this contract. The
rule in Iowa is also disapproved, on
the ground that it "makes the validity of the contract between two parties
depend not upon their own agreement,

nor upon their own acts, but upon
what another person, a stranger to
the contract, may do, even after the
liability upon the contract had become
absolute by the destruction of the
property, if, in fact, there was any
obligation. The making of the second
contract of insurance violated the
terms of the former contract, if at all,
at the time such second contract
was made. The subsequent affirmance, or disaffirmance, of that contract by the insurer, as he might
elect, would not affect the validity of
the former contract between other
parties:" Ftnke v. Minnesota Farmers'
Mut Co., supra.
In line with the view of the Minnesota Court, as to the question of public policy, is a Georgia case ruled under a statute which provides that "a
second insurance, unless by consent
of the insurer, voids his policy." It
is said of this provision that it is
founded in public policy; it is intended to protect insurers and the
public against the evils of double insurance. It is just as entirely within
this public policy to have a second insurance which one thinks is good, as
to have one which is really good.
Though there is a second policy, technically there may be no second insurance ; but to give this construction to
the statute would be, indeed, sticking
in the bark. The manifest intent of
the law is to prevent the existence of
persons in the community who have
an inducement to set their houses on
fire. To say that this law does not
apply to the case of a man who, in
fact, has this inducement, but who,
if his fraud is discovered, cannot get
the benefit of it, is making the law of
very little effect. The second policy
in this case was not binding upon the
company in consequence of misrepresentations made by the insured:
Lackey v. Georgia, etc. Co., supra.
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Simultaneous policies.-Two policies
in different companies were to take
effect at the same hour of the same
day, one of which policies provided
that if insurance should be or should
hereafter be made, covenant should
be given, etc. In a suit on the policy
which so stipulated, the Court observed that whether the other was
prior or subsequent, was immaterial.
If prior, the defendant ought to have
had notice of it, and if subsequent, it
ought to have had it. Though the
risk commenced, as to each, at the
same moment, yet, without proof it
cannot be presumed that the agents
of two different companies issued to
the same assured simultaneous policies. The presumption in law, as
well as in fact, is, in the absence of
proof, that one policy was antecedent
to the other, and that notice ought to
have been given. And looking at the
reason and object of the provision, it
seems that if proof had been made of
the simultaneousness of the policies,
notice should have been given: Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Stein, supra. Defendant company insured plaintiff, and
without his authority placed part of
the risk in another company. Both
policies were of the same tenor and
date. That obtained by defendant
was neither prior nor subsequent to
its own, and the absence of the required indorsement from it did not
affect the other policy: Vashington Co.
v. Davison (1868), 30 Md. 91.
Renaced and substituted policies.-A
renewal is in one sense a new contract, but it is not other insurance
within the meaning of policies. It is
but a continuation of an existing insurance. If notice of the original insurance has been properly given, it is
good through all true renewals of it:
Pitney v. Glen's Falls Co., supra;
approving Brown v. Cattaraugus Mut.
Co. (1858), 18 N. Y. 385. But re-
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newing insurance which it was represented would expire at a given time,
and would not be renewed, avoids
a policy: Dietz v. Mound City Mut.
Co. (1866), 38 Mo. 85.
In substituting a policy for an expired one, which was carried by consent, the amount being the same, is
not contrary to the usual condition:
First Baptist Society v. -illsborough
Mut. Co. (1849), 19 N. H. 580; Russell v. State Co. (1874), 55 Mo. 585,
595; New Orleans Ass'n v. Rolbery
(1886), 64 Miss. 51. Other insurance
was allowed. Notice was required to
be given of all additional insurances,
and of all changes which might be
made therein. A new policy was obtained from the same company as that
whose policy was consented to, and
for the same sum. The total amount
of the insurance was distributed materially different by the second policy
than by the former one. The omission
to give notice was fatal to the claim
under the original policy: Simpson v.
Pennsylvania Co. (1861), 38 Pa. 250.
Unless notice is required in such a
case by the terms of the policy, it
need not be given: American Co. v.
McCrea (1881), 8 Lea (Tenn.), 513.
But see infra.
The application covenanted that
the property upon which insurance
was desired was then insured for
$8000 in two companies named. This
was not true. Soon after the desired
policy issued, policies were obtained
in two other companies for that
amount. Notice of these was not
given as required, and it was claimed
that because the whole amount of insurance did not exceed the sum which
was allowed, the obligation to give
notice did not apply. The Court
ruled that the insurance obtained was
other insurance than that to which
consent was given, and the failure to
give notice was fatal: Conway T. Co.
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v. Hudson R. Co. (1853), 12 Cash.
(Mass.) 144.
If notice of subsequent insurance is
required to be given, the fact that a
policy obtained is a substitute for a
previous one issued by another company, notice of which'was given, and
for a less amount, does not relieve the
insured from complying with the condition: Burt v. People's Mut. Co.
(1854), 2 Gray (Mass.), 397.
Extent of Jbrfeiture.- If the premium is entire, and the conditions
of a policy insuring the whole property have been violated by obtaining
one which covered only part of such
property, the whole claim under the
prior :policy is forfeited: Kimball v.
Howard Co., supra; Allen v. Merchants' Mat. Co., supra. This is the
rule if the property is so situated as
to constitute substantially one risk,
though the policy apportions the insurance to each class of property, in
this case, a building and the furniture
,in it: Havens v. Home Co. (1887), 111
Ind. 90. The cases which hold with
and against this view are collected in
the opinion in this case, and also in
Berryman's Insurance Digest, pp.
830-833, and notes. They arose out
of breaches of other conditions than
are herein considered, and for that
reason are not stated here.
Notice of other insurance.-There is
an obvious distinction between notice
of a past and subsisting insurance,
and notice of a desire or intention to
obtain a future insurance. A subsisting insurance is a fact, and capable of proof. If written notice of it be
given, the company makes its new
policy with alsolute knowledge that
double insuraxce will subsist the moment it is made; and it subsists by
its act and consent. But mere notice
that the insured wishes to make further assurance, to which assent is not
given, then or after it is made, does

not have the same effect: Forbes v.
Agawam Mut. Co. (1852), 9 Cush.
(Mass.) 470. If it is required that
notice shall be given to the company,
and indorsed on the policy, or acknowledged in writing, notice of an
intention to procure other insurance,
given to the agent of the company
which has insured the property, is
not sufficient: Kimball v. Howard
Co. supra; Healey v. Imperial Co.
(1869), 5 Nev. 268; New Orleans
Ass'n v. Grijffin (1886), 66 Tex. 232;
Scienck v. Mercer Nut. Co., supra.
Notice that there is another insurance, and that it is the intention to
renew it, is not notice of the fact of
renewal :.Healey v. Imperial Co., supra.
A requirement that notice shall be
given with "reasonable diligence,"
is not satisfied by serving it seven
months after a second policy was obtained, and after a loss had occurred :
Kimball v. Howard Co., supra. The
words "reasonable diligence" make
unnecessary delay fatal to a recovery.
An unexplained failure to serve notice
for nineteen days is conclusive proof
of a want of such diligence M
Hellen v.
Hamilton Co. (1858), 17 N. Y. 609-620.
If the insured has a specified number
of days in which to give notice, the
insurer is not relieved, unless it
shows that the forbidden policy was
in force for that length of time before
the loss: Cumberland Mt. Co. v.
Giltinan (1886), 48 N. J. L. 495.
The first insurer is not chargcable
with the knowledge of a broker who
effected a subsequent insurance in
that capacity, and whose services
were compensated by such insurer by
commissions on the premiums he paid
on such risks as were accepted: Ifellen v. Hamilton Co., supra; Royal Co.
v. M3cCrea (1881), 8 Lea (Tenn.),
531. If the policy provides that the
broker who effected the insurance
shall be the insured's agent, notice
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to him does not affect the company:
actual indorsement. In accord with
the later Missouri case are N. E. F. 4Fire Ass'n v. Hogwood (1886), 82 Va.
M. Co. v. Scettler, supra; Miller v.
342.
A condition which requires notice Bartjbrd Co. (1886), 70 Iowa, 704;
to the company is not met by giving
Schenck v. Mercer County Mut. Co.,
it to one who had been its agent, but supra. The agent's neglect to make
who had ceased to act as such, and the proper indorsement cannot affect
had given public notice to that effect:
the insured's rights: Ibid.
Illinois Mut. Co. v. Malloy (1869), 50
It was required that all applications
Ill. 419. If it is not provided how or should be in writing. The blanks
to whom notice shall be given, and it prepared did not contain a form for a
is given to an agent who has apparent statement as to other insurance, which
authority, under circumstances indi- was required to be given to the comcating that he had general power, pany. Parol notice given an agent
then, although the fact was that his who was empowered to solicit conauthority was limited, the insured tracts, make surveys, and receive apbeing without knowledge of the ex- plications while lie was preparing the
tent of his power, notice to him application for the policy in suit, was
binds his principal: Pionix Co. v. held sufficient, though the company
Spiers, Ct. App. Ky., May, 1888. never received it: McEwen v. MontKnowledge of the agent who issued gomery Mut. Co. (1843), 5 Hill (N. Y.),
the policy, and his agreement that 101. A condition requiring the infurther insurance may be taken, binds suied to give notice of other insurhis principal, if notice is not required ance made on his behalf, does not
to be given the company in writing:
require notice of insurance made othKenton Co. v. Shea (1869), 6 Bush erwise than by his authority or sub(Ky.), 174; Von Bories v. United Co. sequent sanction: Franklin Co. v.
(1871), 8 Id. 133. Notice to an agent, Drake (1841). 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 47.
In the absence of a requirement as
while he is such, concerning business
within the scope of his authority, is to the form of notice and the manner
notice to his priicipal. The policy of its service, any definite and certain
issued by defendant's agent, who was information communicated to an agent
also agent for another company, had authorized to act for the company, by
expired, and he had notified the in- the insured or his agent, is all that is
Union Co. v. Murphy
sured that it could not be renewed on necessary:
the same terms. The insured made
(1886), Sup. Ct. Pa., 17 W. N. C. 243.
If a prior policy has been issued by
known to the agent his purpose to
keep up all the insurance lie usually the same agent who granted a second
carried, and procured a policy for the one, to a party who had an insurable
same amount in another company, interest in the property, and the perand told the agent what he had done. son insured by the second policy did
The latter said it was all right : Hay- not know of the existence of the
ward v. National Co. (1873), 52 Mo. first, his failure to give notice is im181, overruling Hutchinson v. I~estern material: Rowley v. Empire Co.
Co. (1855). 21 Id. 97, which held that (1867), 36 N. Y. 550.
the condition as to the indorsement of
If an insurer has failed to issue a
consent was a condition precedent to policy according to its contract, it canthe right to recover, and that nothing not visit upon the insured prejudicial
would prevent a forfeiture but an results growing out of its neglect. In
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such a case notice to the local agent
of other insurance is all that is required, and his consent or acquiesoence is equivalent to an indorsement :
Baile v. St. Joseph Co. (1881), 73 Mo.
371. Actual knowledge of the other
insurance is all that the first insurer
can insist upon: Eureka Co. v. Robinaem (1867), 56 Pa. 256.
If the policy of a mutual company
requires that written notice shall be
given the company, and acknowledged
by the secretary in writing, the mere
knowledge of an agent, who is not
authorized to issue pol:cies, is not
such notice as binds his principal:
Commonwealth Mutual Co. v. Huntzinger, supra. A condition requiring
that notice shall be giveii to the
company, and that it shall be indorsed, or otherwise acknowledged in
writing, is not complied with by exhibiting a memorandum of subsequent
insurance to an agent of the first insurer who was authorized to receive
notice thereof and to enter it on his
policy-book, though such agent took
the memorandum to make an entry
and returned it to the insured, and
said that he had entered it, and that
it would be indorsed on the policy, no
such entry being in fact made: Worcester Bank v. Hartford Co. (1853), 11
Cnsh. (Mass.) 265. Contra: Illinois
Mut. Co. v. Maloy, supra. See the
cases stated supra, and the paragraphs
".Estoppel" and "Waiver, infra."
A mistake in a notice regularly
given, whereby it appeared that the
whole of the additional insurance was
placed in one company, the fact being
that it was equally divided between
two companies, is immaterial: Benjarnin v. Saratoga Mut. Co. (1858), 17
N. Y. 415. If the fact of other insurance is regularly made known, the
terms and conditions upon which it
was made are immaterial, no questions
being asked relating thereto: McM-

iwn v. Portzou Mut. Co. (1850), 22
N. H. 15.
The proposals for insurance and the
policy required that notice of all previous insurance should be given the
company and indorsed on the policy
or otherwise acknowledged by it in
writing. Held, that, at law, whatever might be the case in equity, mere
parol notice was not sufficient ; that it
was necessary that a prior policy
should be mentioned in or indorsed
upon the later one : Carpenterv. Providence Co., supra.
Consent to other insurance.-Under
the by-laws of a mutual company, any
policy which it issued on property
previously insured, was to be void,
unless the previous insurance was expressed therein. The policy in suit
contained this condition, but did not
contain any statement as to existing
insurance. The company had knowledge that there was insurance on the
property, and that it was the insured's intention that it should continue. He accepted the policy without knowing that it did not mention
such insurance. It was ruled, in a
suit by his assignee, that the failure
to comply with the condition avoided
the policy, and parol evidence could
not be received to remedy the defect:
B rrett v. Union Mut. Co. (1851), 7
Cush. (Mass.) 175. Defendant's bylaws required that subsequent insurance should have "the consent of the
directors, signified by a statement
thereof in the policy, or by indorsement thereon, signed by the secretary." One of its directors indorsed
a memorandum made by the applicant on his application, which was
thereon when it reached the company,
and was as follows: "Applicant asks
leave to insure $1000 on same property
in some other company. Please signify the assent of the company in the
policy." This was not in compliance
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with the by-laws: Forbes v. Agawam absence of such agent's signature,
Ant. Co., supra.
The required without distinct proof that it was made
assent was not inferable from the by some one who was, in fact, or by his
knowledge of the agent who issued conduct might fairly be supposed to
be, authorized to bind the company in
both policies: Ibid. The charter of
the defendant company gave it the that way, unless his act was so recogpower to make by-laws, and they nized and acted upon as to bind it by
provided that any insurance subse- es oppel: Security Co. v. Fay (1871),
quently obtained, without the presi- 22 Mich. 467.
An agent who is authorized to make
dent's written consent, should avoid
any policy it had issued. The by- and revoke contracts, is the proper
law containing this provision Vas at- person to consent, if his powers are
taclied to the policy in suit. The not restricted, or the insured has no
verbal consent of the president to notice of the limitations on them:
Planters' Mut. Co. v. Lyons (1873), 38
other insurance, was not binding on
the company : Hale v. Mechanics' Mut. Tex. 253. If the agent who effects
the insurance, and is intrusted with
Co. (1856),6 Gray (Mass.), 169.
A mutual company, whose by-laws the policy to deliver it to the insured,
provide that certain of its officers may is notified, before the policy reaches
consevnt to other insurance, is not
him, of other insurance, and makes
the proper indorsement, the company
bomd by consent given by its agent:
Be/ir v. German Mo't. Co. (1879), 68 is bound by his act: Dayton Co. v.
Ind. 347. None but the officers au- Kelly (1873), 24 Ohio St. 345. Under
thorized can give binding consent : a condition that assent should be inStark- Mut. Co. v. Ifurd (1850), 19 dorsed on the policy, or else assented
to in writing, if an agent authorized
Ohio, 149, 177.
to issue a policy delivers it with
If the secretary of the first insurer
has knowledge of a subsequent pol- knowledge of prior insurance, the
icy, and advised that it be procured, policy so delivered is the written asand two of its directors verbally as- sent of the company to such insursented thereto, such number being ance: Kenton, etc. Co. v. Shea, supra.
authorized to issue policies, and the Verbal consent given by an agent,
condition did not require that the with krowledge that it will be acted
notice or consent should be in writing,
on, waives the requirement that the
but did require the consent of the di- consent shall be written upon the
policy: Carrugiv. Atlantic Co. (1869),
rectors, five in number, a majority of
whom could transact business, such 40 Ga. 135. If it was given under
consent is good: Goodall v. New Fng- such circumstances as obliged him to
consent or refuse, and was unequivocal
land Clb. (182), 25 N. H. 169, 194.
The policy provided that it would and with knowledge of all the facts,
not lie valid, unless countersigned by there is a waiver: New Orleans Ass'n
a general agent at a designated place, v. Grifflin, supra. All the policies were
and prohibited other insurance, prior issued by the same agent. He testiand subsequent, without written con- fied that the insurers were notified of
sent thereon. It was said that every the fact that there was other insurance,
sound rule of construction required and his books, as defendant's agent,
that consent should be signed by the showed the fact that other policies
designated agent. An unsigned con- were issued. It was ruled that the obsent could not be sustained in the ject and purpose of indorsing consent
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on the policy was fully attained: Insurance Co.of N. A. v. McDowell (1869),
50 IM. 120.
Defendant's policy was not to be
valid unless it was countersigned by
the agent who issued it. Immediate
notice of other insurance was required
to be given to its secretary. Eight
months after it was issued, and befbre
loss, such agent indorsed his consent
to such insurance, and notified the
company. No objection was made.
Held, that if the company desired to
repudiate the policy, it ought to have
done so on receipt of the notice. It
could not, with knowledge of the facts,
retain the premium and withhold objections until after loss: Farmers'
Mut. Co.v. Taylor (1873), 73 Pa. 342.
A general agent's verbal consent
binds his principal, although the
policy provides that none of its conditions shall be waived, except by writing. Consent to other insurance is
given by promising to indorse it on
the policy: Mforrison v. Insurance Co.
(1887), 69 Tex. 353.
The knowledge of one who is employed by the general agent of an insurer to solicit risks and collect
premiums, and who has power to bind
the company from the date of the application until such agent acts
thereon, and who is paid a commission by such agent,- binds the company: Hamilton v. Home Co. (1887),
94 Mo. 353.
A letter written by defendant's secretary to plaintiff stated: "I have
received your notice of additional insurance." This was a sufficient acknowledgment and approval to satisfy
a condition requiring the consent to
be indorsed or otherwise acknowledged
and approved in writing. After the
receipt of notice the policy continued
in force until the insurer made its
election to continue or terminate the

risk:

Putter v.

Ontario

Mut.

Co.

(1843), 5 Hill (N. Y.), 147.
If the president of a company has
knowledge of other insurance on the
property before, it issues a policy
thereon, and omits to make the required indorsement, the absence of
such indorsement, in a suit to reform
the contract, cannot be urged: National, etc. Co. v. Crane (1860), 16 Md.
260-296.
An offer by an agent to take other
insurance is not a consent to any specific additional insurance, and does
not meet a requirement that consent
shall be written on the policy: Allemania Co. v. Hurd (1877), 37 Mich.
11.
A by-law requiring consent to be
written in the policy is satisfied by
writing it on the margin of the policy:
Liscom v. Massachusetts Mut. Co.
(1845), 9 Met. (Mass.) 205. A statute requiring that consent that shall
be signified by indorsement on the
the back of the policy, signed by the
president and secretary, is complied
with by a recital in the policy of the
prior insurance and its amount, the
policy being signed by the officers
designated: First Baptist Society'v.
Hillsboroughi Mfut. Co., stupra. If consent to additional insurance is in
writing, it is good though it is not
written on the policy, as that instrument required it should be: Afattocks
v. Des Moines Co. (1887), 74 Iowa,
233. The consent need not specify
the companies in which the additional
insurance may be placed, if there is
no restriction in the policy: Westchester
Co. v. Earle (1876), 33 Mich. 143.
If insurance is taken in excess of
the sum specified in the consent, and
is in force when the loss occurs, the
consenting insurer is relieved from
liability: Shurtleff v. Plnix Co.
(1869), 57 Me. 137; Bonnecdlle v.
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Western Co. (1887), 68 Wis. 298;
Behrens v. Germania Co. (1882), 58
Iowa, 26. But the insured is not
bound to take the full amount permitted: Licom v. Boston Mnt. Co. (1845),
9 Met. (Mass.) 205. Consent to take
additional insurance to a specified
amount, means prior as well as subsequent insurance: Behrens v. Germania Co., supra.
If a contract for present insurance
is made, and a policy is to be issued
subsequently on the same risk, the
contract being subject to the conditions of the printed policy, a condition therein, requiring that other
insurance shall be indorsed on the
policy, does not make it necessary
that an indorsement be made in or on
the contract: Dayton Co. v. Kelly
(1873), 24 Ohio St. 345.
Oral consent given by an agent,
to an agent of one insured, to take
additional insurance for his principal,
does not follow an assignment of the
policy, and authorize him who was
the insured's agent, to take other such
insurance after he has become the
owner of his principal's property:
Hower v. State Co. (1882), 58 Iowa,
51.
Estoppel.-If the insurer, on being
notified of other insurance by its
agent, does not make the proper indorsement or notify the insured that
it refuses to carry the risk, it is estopped from claiming a forfeiture:
Planters' lbit. Co. v. Lyons (1873), 38
Tex. 253. Defendant issued a policy
for $6000, and at its request, was relieved of one-half of the risk, which
the insured placed in a company
named by the first insurer. Defendant's policy was given to its agent for
the purpose of having the proper indorsement made. This he neglected
to do. Held, on demurrer, that defendant was bound to give cnusent,
and to do all other acts which might

be necessary to prevent the insured
from being injured by the additional
insurance: Cobb v. Insurance Co. ofN.
A. (1873), 11 Kan. 93.
The complaint alleged the execution of the policy sued upon, the loss
of the property covered by it, and
that it was expressly agreed and understood that said plaintiff was to
have permission to take out an additional insurance of $1000 on said
building in any other company and at
any time she desired, and said company agreed to insert said condition
in said policy, which it wholly failed
to do. The plaintiff averred, that relying upon said promise, and in pursuance of said contract and agreement,
she had effectea an insurance on said
building, as permitted by the express
agreement aforesaid. No notice of the
second insurance was given. In addition to the usual clause, prohibiting
other insurance, the policy in suit expressed that nothing less than a disagreement, clearly
tinct, specific
expressed and indorsed on it, should
be construed as a waiver of any conThe comdition or restriction in it.
plaint did not show an estoppel,
because it did not appear that plaintiff was induced to accept the policy,
without knowledge that the stipulation
was not on it; nor that she ever requested that it should be indorsed:
Havens v. Home Co. (1887), 111 Ind.
90.
An insurer is not estopped from
claiming a forfeiture, if its conduct
has not misled the insured to his prejudice. Mere knowledge, on its part,
that he has violated the conditions of
the contract, is immaterial: New
York- Co. v. Watson (1871), 23 Mich.
486.
A policy in a mutual company expressly referred to the act which incorporated it and the by-laws of the
company. Two sections of the charter
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were printed on the back of the policy,
but in such a way as not to indicate
that the entire instrument was set out
there. Among the omitted provisions
were those which forbade other insurance without the consent of the directors, indorsed on the policy. It
was claimed that the company was
estopped from setting up the provisions zeferred to, because they were
not made a part of the policy. This
positicn was held untenable, and the
whole of the charter and by-laws were
considered part of the contract : Fabyan v. Union Mut. Co. (1856), 33 N.
H. 203.
If the indorsement which gave consent to other insurance authorized
the insured to carry a less amount
than the notice specified, and was
consented to, and the insured did not
notice the variance until after loss,
evidence to show that consent was
given to the full amount taken is admissible: Greene v. Equitable Co.
(1877), 11 R. 1. 434.
If notice of othEr insurance is given
to an agent, who has full discretion
in the premises, and who did not object to it. and said nothing about cancelling the first policy, and who
subsequently effected additional in-"
surance on the same risk in other
companies he represented, the first
insurer is estopped: Crescent Co. v.
Griffin (1883), 59 Tex. 609; Hadey
v. N. H. Co. (1875), 55 N. H. 110;
Fshbeck v. Rwsnix Co. (1880), 54 Cal.
422 ; Hayward v. National Co. (1873),
52 Mo. 181 ; Harwitz v. Equitable Co.
(1867), 40 Id. 557; Russell v. State
Co. (1874), 55 Id. 585. If a soliciting
agent, with knowledge of existing insurance, prepares an application for a
policy and represents therein that
there is no insurance, and the applicant signs it in good faith, the
company cannot set up the prior
insurance: American Co. v. Luttrell

(1878), 89 IIl. 314. And this is so if
an agent, acting for two companies,
falsely informs the insured that the
proper indorsement had been made:
Mentz v. Lancaster Co. (1875), 79 Pa.
475 ; Redstrake v. CumberlandMut. Co.
(1882), 44 N. J. L. 294; Combs v.
Shrewsbury Mut. Co. (1881), 34 N. J.
Eq. 403. Or, that an indorsement
was not necessary: Kitchen v. Hartford Co. (1885), 57 Mich. 135. Or, if
the agent of the first insurer has led
the insured to believe that he has no
objections to his obtaining another
policy: American Co. v. Gallatin
(1879), 48 Wis. 36.
Notwithstanding the first policy requires the written consent of the company to other insurance, and'provides
that the use of general terms or anything less than a distinct specific
agreement, clearly expressed, and
indorsed on it, shall not be construed
as a waiver of any condition or restriction therein, yet, if an agent
authorized to issue policies, and who
has issued the one in suit, and whose
power does not appear to have been
restricted in any way, has so acted
with the insured as to bind himself,
by estoppel, not to dispute the
validity of the subsequent policy, his
principal is also estopped: Westchester
Co. v. Earle (1876), 33 Mich. 143.
But, if the policy gives the insured
notice that the insurer's agent cannot
waive, modify, or strike from it, any of
its provisions, nor revive it, if a forfeiture shall have accrued, the insurer
is not estopped by the agent's assurance to the insured that other insurance will be all right: Cleaver v.
Traders' Co., Sup. Ct. Mich., April,
1887.
After a loss, and with knowledge of
the violation of defendant's policy,
its general agent required the insured
to furnish plans and specifications of
the building destroyed. In doing so,
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expense was incurred. This was held
decisive as to the defendant, and it
could not thereafter claim that a forfeiture bad accrued. It was innaterial that another insurer of the
same property made a similar requirement; and it seems that it would
have been immaterial if both insurers
had joined in such demand: Webster
v. 1'lznix Co. (1874), 36 Wis. 67.
An insurer, whose agent, with full
knowledge of the existence of other
policies on the property, participates
in adjusting a loss and acquiesces in
the apportionment made to each of
the insurers, and promises to pay the
proportion due from his company, is
estopped, if the insured has settled
with the other insurers on the basis
of the adjustment: Fishbeckv. Phcmix
Co. (1880), 54"Cal. 422.
Waiver.-Permission given by indorsement on a policy, to obtain additional insurance to a specified amount,
waives a printed requirement that
notice of other insurance shall be
given, if insurance is not taken in excess of the limit: Benedict v. Ocean
Co. (1865), 31 N.Y. 389; American
Co. v. McCrea (1881), 8 Lea (Tenn.),
513. If the question in the application, concerning other insurance, is
not answered, and a policy is issued
thereon, the condition in the latter
relating thereto is waived: Dayton Co.
v. Kelly (1873), 24 Ohio St. 345. If
the insurer, after receiving notice of
other insurance from its general
agent, omits to cancel its policy, by
returning a proper proportion of the
premium, it waives the right to claim
a forfeiture: Von Bories v. United
Co. (1871), 8 Bush (Ky.), 133. If
the secretary of the company which
issued a policy, declares in writing,
knowing all the facts, that the policy
is good, and subsequently levies an
assessment upon it, such act is a
waiver of the lack of indorsement and

confirms the policy: Atlantic Co. v.
Goodall (1857), 35 N. H. 328. So held
as to the assessment: McKenzie v.
Rianters' Co. (1872), 9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
261. Making an adjustment, with
knowledge of the breach of a condition, is a waiver: Levy v. Peabody Co.
(1877), 10 W. Va. 560.
Consent was required to be indorsed
upon the policy. Plaintiff signed a
blank application, which was filled
out by defendant's general agent; at
the latter's request, the former delivered to him policies upon the same
property in another company, which
had been issued by him as its agent.
No mention was made in the application for the policy in suit, which was
filled up by the agent and forwarded
to defendant as an accepted application, of the existence of the former
policies. The Court observed that
when the former policies were handed
the agent at his own request, he must
have known what the object was, and
had full opportunities to acquire information by reading them. He was
clearly put upon inquiry to know
their relation to the subject on hand.
The plain presumption is that he
read the policies and acquired full
information of their existence and
contents. The notice thus supplied to
him was, on general principles of the
law of agency, notice to the defendant. It must be assumed, accordingly,
that owing to his general agency, the
defendant knew that there was other
insurance on the property, and with
that knowledge, made no statement of
the fact on the policy. This act may
be called a waiver, or may be treated
as an estoppel: itney v. Glen's Falls
Co. (1875), 65 N.Y. 6-28.
Other concurrent insurance to the
amount of $3000 was allowed by
defendant's policy, which provided
that it should be part of the contract,
"that any person other than the
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assured, who may have procured this
insurance to be taken by this company, shall be deemed to be the agent
of the assured named in this policy,
and not of this company, under any
circumstances whatever, or in any
transaction relating to this insurance." The agent who delivered the
policy, knew that the property which
it covered, was insured to the amount
of $6000. Such delivery was held to
be an implied waiver of the condition
prohibiting more than $3000 other insurance: Putnam v. Commonwealth Co.
(1880), 18 Blatch. (U. S. C. Ct. N. D.
N. Y.) 368 ; s.c. (1880), 4 Fed. Repr.
753.
If a general agent of a foreign company, who is authorized in writing,
to countersign and issue policies,
"and otherwise to do and perform the
customary acts and duties of" an insurance agent, and whose duty, it is
shown by the testimony in the case,
is to make indorsements of other insurance, has knowledge of such insurance, and does not disclaim the
authority to make such indorsement,
but postpones doing it, on account of
his own convenience, when the policies are produced for that purpose,
the condition requiring such indorsement will be considered waived. The
knowledge and consent of such an
agent as to the amount of insurance,
are not made ineffectual because he
does not know in precisely what companies it is placed; and a change to
another company, otherwise unexceptionable, does not alter the rule:
Arencan C. Co. v. McCrea (1881), 8
Lea (Tenn.), 513.
If an agent, having authority, insures property, with knowledge that
policies are outstanding upon it, the
condition providing for a forfeiture, is
thereby waived : Lycoming Co. v. Barringer (1874), 73 Ill. 230; Richmond
v. Niagara Co. (1879), 79 N. Y. 230.

iornthal v. Western Co. (1883), 88
N. C. 71 ; chomerv. Ilekla Co. (1880),
50 Wis. 575; Brandup v. St. Paul Co.
(1880), 27 Minn. 393; Geib v. International Co. (1870), 1 Dill. (U. S. C.
Ct. D. Minn.) 443. Although the
policy issued by such agent, provides
that anything less than a distinct,
specific agreement, clearly expressed
and indorsed thereon, shall not be
construed as a waiver of any restriction in it: Roberts v. Continental Co.
(1877), 41 Wis. 321. Under such a
condition as is last stated, and a requirement that a waiver shall be
signed by the secretary, if a general
agent receives a renewal with knowledge of other insurance, the right to
claim a forfeiture is waived : Carrollv.
Charter Oak Co. (1868), 1 Abb. Ct.
App. (N. Y.) 316: affirming s. c.
(1863), 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 292.
If part payment of a loss is made,
under a policy which was issued by
an agent, with knowledge of the existence of other policies, the insured
may recover the full amount: Sherman v. Madison Mfut. Co. (1875), 39
Wis. 104. Taking part, by an agent,
in adjusting a loss, and calling upon
the insured for information, in furnishing which he incurred expense,
is a waiver: Carpenter v. Continental
Co. (1886), 61 Mich. 635. After knowledgeof other insurance and after loss,
defendant's adjuster wrote plaintiff,
in reply to a request for information
as to the attitude of the company concerning the loss, that if insured has
a fair and legal claim under the policy, he should make out "such proofs
as the policy requires and send same
here; and on receipt of same, the
claim shall be investigated at once,
and you shall be promptly advised of
our views." Plaintiff made proof of
his loss and incurred expense in doing
so. This was held to be a waiver!
Cannon v. Home Co. (1881), 53 Wis.
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585. After the loss, the defendant's
adjusting agent, with knowledge of
the second policy, made an offer of
compromise, and raised objections to
such policy. The offer was declined,
and the agent soon after wrote plaintiff that she might make proof of loss,
and the matter would then be taken
into consideration.
At the agent's
request, defects in the proofs were
remedied from time to time, and plaintiff was notified that "in addition to
the objections heretofore made," defendant would insist upon the forfeiture, because of the second insurance.
Hdd, that these facts warranted a
finding that defendant waived the forfeiture: Pennsy/lvania Co. v. Kittle
(1878), 39 Mich. 51.
A general agent of a stock company,
whose place of business is remote from
the company's office, and who is authorized to issue policies and indorse
consent to other insurance, may bind
his principal by a parol waiver of the
condition, requiring insurance .to be
indorsed. Such waiver is provable
by parol evidence: Pechner v. PRenix
Co. (1875), 65 N. Y. 195.
The agent who issued defendant's
policy, also issued one for another
company on the same property, and
subsequently consented to a substitution of the latter policy, but omitted
to make the proper indorsement on
the one in suit. The condition was
thereby waived: Collins v. Farmville
Co. (1878), 79 N. C. 279.
Under a statute, which provides
that any person who shall solicit insurance or procure applications therefor, shall be held to be the soliciting
agent of the company which issues the
policy, an agent of the company who is
authorized to issue policies, and who
sends his clerk to solicit a risk and take
an application, is bound by the latter's
knowledge of other insurance, and the
company which issues a policy pursuVOL. XXXVII.-16

ant to the application, cannot be relieved from liability, because the
required indorsement was not made:
Bennet v. Council Bluffs Co. (1887),
70 Iowa, 600.
The insurer is not bound, after
knowledge that its policy has become
forfeited, and of a loss, to return the
premium for the time the policy had
to run, from the loss till it would
have expired: Plusnix Co. v. Stevenson (1879), 78 Ky. 150.
Parol evidence cannot be received,
to show that a policy prohibiting other
insurance, was delivered with knowledge on the part of the company
which issued it that there was then:
other insurance on the property. To
admit such evidence would be contradicting a written instrument: Batchelder v. Queen Co. (1883), 135 Mass.
449 ; Barrett v. Union, etc. Co. (1851),
7 Cush. (Mass.) 175.
If the policy gives the insured notice that the agent of the insurer is
not authorized to issue policies, nor to
alter the terms of those issued, his
consent cannot amount to a waiver of
the requirement, that the consent of
the company to other insurance shall
be written on the policy: Liverpool,
etc. Co. v. Sorsby (1882), 60 Miss. 302.
The receipt of information concerning other insurance, does not warrant
the inference that there has been a
waiver of the condition concerning
changes in the distribution of the
sum insured, upon the various classes
of property covered by the policy:
Simpson v. Pennsylcania Co. (1861),
38 Pa. 250. To constitute a waiver
or estoppel, the act or conduct of the
insurer must be such that the insured
might reasonably infer therefrom,
that it does not mean to insist upon
the forfeiture, and the insured must
have been misled to his prejudice. A
direction to the insured, after the receipt of an informal claim against the
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insurer, to the effect that if he has
any claim against it under or by
virtue of a policy, such claim must be
made in strict accordance with the
conditions prescribed, is not an admission of liability or a waiver, though
the company then knew of additional
insurance, contrary to its policy, and
the insured subsequently made proofs
of loss and incurred expense in doing
so: Phztnix Co. v. Stevenson (1879),
78 Ky. 150. The condition requiring
written consent, is not waived, where
the right to claim a forfeiture was not
known until after loss, and the insurer's agent appointed an appraiser
to determine the value of the property
saved, and the company did not return the unearned premium: Jewett
v. Home Co. (1870), 29 Iowa, 562.
When the policy in suit was obtained, defendant's agent offered to
place an additional $1000 on the property. The offer was declined. Subsequently the plaintiff took other
insurance to the amount of $1800, and
notified the agent that he had taken
insurance, but did not name the
amount. After a loss the agent of the
first insurer told plaintiff that his
policy required him to make proof of
his loss. This he did, and forwarded
it to the company. The amount of
the additional insurance was first
made known when the proof was received. No waiver br estoppel was
established by these facts, assuming
that the agent's offer to take the additional insurance amounted to a consent to the amount he offered to take:
Bone,,ille v. Western Co. (1887), 68
Wis. 298.
Knowledge on the part of an agent
of an insurer, that a person insured
desires other insurance at a less rate
than his company would give, and
that it was subsequently obtained, is
not evidence of consent or waiver of

the written notice required : Robinson
v. Fire Ass'n (1886), 63 Mich. 90.
An agent whose authority is limited
to receiving applications, making surveys, remitting collections to the general agent and receiving the policies
from him, cannot waive the conditions
therein: Hr alay v. lmperiql Co. (1869),
5 Nev. 268.
The charter of an insurance company is in the nature of an enabling
act; it gives it all the power it possesses, and it is bound to exercise the
power conferred upon it in the manner pointed out therein. Hence, if it
is provided by the charter, that
double insurance shall be void unless
it exists by the consent of the company, indorsed upon the policy under
the hand of the secretary, there can
be no waiver of the requirement, and
it cannot be proved that consent was
given to other insurance, otherwise
than by indorsement as specified:
Couch v.City Co. (1871), 38 Conn. 181.
Compliance with a condition, requiring that subsequent insurance shall
be indorsed, is not waived by notifying the insured, after he obtained
suchinsurance, that an assessment was
due from him, such notice being accompanied by a printed form, containing a schedule of losses, the
insured's claim being included, and
being marked "unadjusted."
It did
not appear that the company then
knew of the forfeiture: Forbesv. Agawarn ffut. Co. (1852), 9 Cush. (Mass.)
470.
Under the charter of a mutual company, one insured therein was deemed
a member for the time specified in his
policy, and was bound to pay his proportion of all losses and expenses
happening to the company during his
connection therewith. An assessment
was paid after a loss of the property,
but during the life of the policy. A
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forfeiture previously incurred by the
act of the insured, was not thereby
waived: Philbrook v. New England
Mut. Co. (1853), 37 Me. 137.
An agent of a mutual company,
acting under a written appointment,
made subject to a by-law, which made
it his duty to take surveys and receive applications, and when required,
to examine into the circumstances of
a loss and make report, and, by the
terms of a policy, to approve of assignments thereof, and collect assessments, is not authorized to accept
notice of insurance beyond the amount
allowed by the policy, or waive the
consequences. This is especially the
case in a mutual company, the insured being bound to know its rules :
Mitchell v. Lycoming Jfut. Co. (1865),
51 Pa. 402.
Explanatory.-Inthe foregoing statement of the cases which treat of the
subject of other insurance, no attempt
has been made at discussing, comparing or harmonizing the adjudications.
Indeed, an effort to do the latter
would be fruitless, and the lack of
space forbids the experiment, as to
either of the former. A casual survey
and comparison of the cases and the
dates of their decision will disclose
that there is a marked and growing
tendency on the part of the courts to
liberalize, especially in the application of the principles of waiver and
estoppel, against insurers. This has
been made necessary by the conditions which have found their way into
the modern policies. The same tendency is noticeable in the later cases,
as to the powers of agents. But this
is not so with regard to the validity of
the second policy, or the New England
-ule of construction. For a long time,
the weight of authority was in favor
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of that rule; but the scale has been
turned the other way, by the adjudications of the past five or six years.
Since 1880, but one court which was
not committed to that rule, has declared in its favor; while eight or
nine, which had not taken position on
it, have, during the years since,
adopted the opposing rule. The question is an open one in several jurisdictions, and therefore of practical
importance. The number of cases in
the courts of last resort is so great
that the decisions of intermediate
courts could not be considered; nor
could those of foreign tribunals, which
are principally to be found in the reports of the British colonies.
J. R. BERRYMAN.
Madison, Wis.

In the recent case of Commercial
Union Assuirance Co. v. Scammon, Sup.
Ct. Ill. Nov. 15, 1888, 28 AIF.ERICAZ(
LAW REGISTER, 190, an interesting

question arose. After a property had
been insured by the owner, another
policy upon the same risk was, without the knowledge of the original assured, issued by the same company
to a third person, who wrongfully
claimed title. A loss having occurred,
the amount of the latter policy was
paid by the company to the second
assured, who was subsequently, however, compelled by a decree in chancery to account for the moneys thus
received to the real owner. It was
held, that these facts constituted no
defence to an action by the latter
upon the first policy, and that he was
entitled to recover, notwithstanding
the second policy and the receipt by
him of its proceeds under such decree.
JAMES C. SELLERS.

WEIDEKIND v. TUOLUMNE WATER CO.

Supreme Court of California.
WEIDEKIND v. TUOLUMNE WATER CO.
It is error, for which a new trial will be granted, for the trial Court to permit an attorney, who has formerly acted for the plaintiff, to appear for the
defendant, on a subsequent trial of the same case.

from the Superior Court of Tuolumne County.
F. W. Street, for appellant.
-E.
A. Rogers, contra.
FOOTE, Commissioner, December 23,1887. This is an action
to recover damages, alleged to have been done to the plaintiff's
mining claim, as is asserted, by the negligence of the defendant,
which eventuated in the breaking of a dam, and the overflow
of the water which it had confined. The jury trying the
cause, returned a verdict for the defendant, upon which the
Court rendered judgment, from which, and an order overruling a motion for a new trial, the plaintiff has appealed.
The plaintiff assigns for error, that the Court, against his
objection, allowed an attorney and counsellor-at-law, who had
formerly acted for the plaintiff in this very case, when it was
previously tried, to appear and act on behalf of the defendant,
on the trial of the cause last had. That attorney made this
statement regarding the matter in the presence of the Court,
while the trial was progressing: " As the Court well knows,
Mr. Weidekind (the plaintiff), in the first trial of this case,
did retain Mr. Dorsey and myself. I drew the complaint,
and participated in the first trial of this case, in this Court.
My compensation was to depend upon my success. As soon
as I had earned that by our success, this plaintiff saw fit to
discharge me and retain other counsel. With that act of his,
I have never found fault. I have never been paid a cent by
him for my services. An appeal was taken from the judgment in that trial entered. A new trial was granted by our
Supreme Court. A new trial was had. Judgment was entered against plaintiff. An appeal was again taken, and
another reversal followed. In each of these trials, plaintiff
has had other counsel than myself. I am here to assist Mr.
Rogers in the trial of this case, with all the knowledge I
APPEAL
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have gained in the three trials." Thereupon he did act as an
attorney and counsellor on the trial, sitting by and assisting
the attorney of record, arguing disputed points before the
Court, and examining witnesses; the Court having overruled
the repeated objection of plaintiff's couxisel. This action of
the Court is contended to be such an irregularity on its part,
as prevented the plaintiff from having a fair trial. It was
within the power of the Court, if satisfied that the attorney
in question had acted on the plaintiff's side of the case on the
former trial, to prohibit his acting on the other side in another
trial: Weeks on Attys., § 120. There can be no doubt, from
the statement of the attorney to the Court, that he proposed
to act, and it is also certain that he did act, as an attorney and
counsellor for the defendant in the trial of a cause where he
had formerly acted for the plaintiff. The trial Court had a
right, and it was its duty, to have forbidden the attorney
from changing sides in the same suit, though at different
trials; for to do otherwise was "to defeat the very purpose
for which courts were organized, viz: the administration of
justice :" Wilson v. State (1861), 16 Ind. 392. The evidence
in this case and the statement of the attorney himself, was
sufficient to show the Court that his intention was, for the
benefit of the defendant, to use at that time, all the knowledge and secrets he had gained from his former client, in
preparing for and conducting one trial, and observing and
watching the developments of two others. This Court,
speaking to such a question, says: We are of opinion that
the Court, in that case, would have restrained him, even had
he been unjustly discharged, and he was allowed, as contended, to be employed by the adverse party. The law secures
the client the privilege of objecting at all times and forever
to an attorney, solicitor, or counsellor, from disclosing information in a cause confidentially given while the relation
exists. The client alone can release the attorney, solicitor, or
counsel from this obligation. The latter cannot discharge
himself from this duty imposed on him by law: Be Cowdery
(1886), 69 Cal. 32. The attorney himself boldly avowed his
intention to so act. The Court permitted him to do it, notwithstanding the plaintiff's objection. This we think was an
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error, and, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, injury
must be presumed to have resulted to the plaintiff, whereby
he was prevented from having a fair trial of his case. We
perceive no further prejudicial error, but for the reasons indicated, the judgment and order should be reversed, and the
cause remanded for a new trial.
Disability of attorney to act on both
sides.-An attorney is not permitted
to serve professionally, both parties to
a suit: Sherwood v. Saratoga R. Co.
(1852), 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 650; Herrick v. Catley (1865), 30 How. Pr. (N.
Y.) 208; s. c. 1 Daly (N. Y.), 512;
Price v. Grand Rapids R. Co. (1862),
18 Ind. 137; Branch v. Harrington
(1875), 49 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 196;
Warren v. Sprague (1844), 4 Edw. Ch.
(N. Y.) 416; Valentine v. Stewart
(1860), 15 Cal. 387; DeCelis v. Brunson (1879), 53 Id. 372. Thus, he
cannot represent, at the same time, a
county and the commissioners against
whom, at the county's instance, a
writ of mandate is asked: Clarke Co.
v. Comm'rs (1868), 1 Wash. Ter. 250.
So, an attorney after once acting as
such in a suit, cannot abandon his
client's case and go over to the other
side: Valentine v. Stewart, sltra; Com.
v. Gibbs (1855), 4 Gray (Mass.),
146; Gaulden v. State (1851), 11 Ga.
47; Batch v. Fogerty (1871), 10 Abb.
Pr. (N. Y.) 147; s. c. 40 How. Pr.
(N. Y.) 492. He cannot be allowed
to make use of the information he
has gained, for the benefit of the opposite party: Price v. Grand Rapids R.
Co., supra. In an Indiana case, the
defendant in a criminal prosecution,
filed an affidavit that he had engaged
one F., a lawyer, to defend him; that
he bad disclosed to him the facts of
his case and his evidence, etc. F.
filed an affidavit, admitting the retainer, but denying that he had
learned anything from defendant as

to his grounds or means of defence.
The Court held that F. should not be
allowed to assist in the prosecution,
as it would be a defeating of the ends
of justice: Wilson v. State (1861), 16
Ind. 392.
If, in the course of other business,
the attorney has become acquainted
with the secrets of another, he will
not thereby be prevented from acting against him: Price v. Grand
R pids B. Co., supra. The fact that
plaintiff's attorney officially, as an
officer of the government, at a former time, held a different view of the
law of the case from that afterwards
advocated by him as such attorney,
need not, of itself, disqualify him from
accepting plaintiff's retainer: Smith
v. Chicago 4- Northwestern B. Co.
(1883), 60 Iowa, 515. Where the attorney to collect a note, was appointed
by the defendant his attorney to confess judgment on it, he having full
knowledge of the attorney's position,
it was held not illegal: Wassell v.
Reardon (1851), 11 Ark. 705, the
Court saying: "As a general rule, it
is true that agents cannot act so as
to bind their principals, where they
have or represent interests adverse
This rule is
to the principals."
founded upon the consideration that
the principal bargains for the skill
and vigilant attention of the agent to
the subject-matter intrusted to him;
and the lolicy of the law will not tolerate the existence of an adverse interest in the agent to that of his
principal, for fear it may influence his
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conduct to the prejudice of interests
of the principal. This well-recognized
rule is particularly applicable to buying and selling agents, where the
principal contracts for the services of
an agent, at a time when he has no
interest in the subject intrusted to
him, but subsequently by his own
act, acquires an interest in it, adverse
to that of the principal. In the case
before us, the attorney had no interest in the matter of his agency, unless
it should arise from his claim to compensation as a collector, which may or
may not have been otherwise settled;
nor had the plaintiff any interest
whatever in the act to be done, of
which the principal at the time he instituted him agent, was not fully advised; and if such disqualification
existed, he, by his own act, expressly
waived it by conferring upon the
agent such power, with a knowledge
of the facts. When it is remembered
that the whole ground upon which
this rule is based, rests upon the
fraudulent advantage which such an
interest may stimulate the agent to
take to the prejudice of his principal's
rights, it will scarcely be contended
that the circumstances of this case
bring it within the reason and spirit
of the rule. The principal was informed of the nature and extent of the
interest which the payee in the note
had in the act to be performed by
the agent. The facts disclosed in the
instrument itself prove this; and that
it was intended that the act to be performed should inure to the mutual
benefit of both the payer and payee;
to the first, by saving him the expense incident to a suit in the usual
form; to the other, by facilitating and
making certain a recovery." And see
Sipes v. Whitney (1876), 30 Ohio St.
69. And the fact that a contract is
drawn up by and under the advice of
one who is the counsel for both
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parties, does not invalidate it, in the
absence of fraud, and where the relation of the attorney was known to,
both: Joslin v. Cowee (1874), 56 N.Y.
626. The solicitor who files a bill for
the appointment of a receiver, ought
not to act as solicitor for the receiver ;
but if the defendant appears by the
same solicitor in the suit by the receiver, as he did in the original suit,
such appearance amounts to a waiver
of all objections : Varren v. Sprague
(1844) 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 416.
Di 'ability to act in diverse capacities.
-In like manner and for like reasons,
an attorney is not permitted to act in
diverse capacities. Thus, a solicitor
in a cause has been held disabled
from acting as a special master to execute the decree: lVhite v. Haffaker
(1862), 27 Ill 349 ; an attorney, from
acting as administrator of an estate,
and at the same time as an attorney
to collect a debt of the intestate:
Spinks v. Davis (1856), 32 Miss. 152;
a constable de facto, from acting as
attorney in the case, whose summons
he served: Wilkinson v. Force (1864),
41 Barb. (N. Y.) 370; Knight v.
O'Dell (1859), 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
279; an attorney for the plaintiff,
from issuing a writ as justice: Ingraham v. Leland (1847), 19 Vt. 304. And
it has been held that counsel who
represent private interests, cannot be
retained to assist in criminal prosecutions growing out of such interests :
People v. Hurst (1879), 41 Mich. 328.
Where an attorney receives a large
sum of money from his client as payment for services to be rendered to her,
in and about the settlement of the
estate of her deceased husband, lie is
bound at all times, to hold himself in
readiness to render such services, disembarrassed from all complication
with others, and to take no position
against her, and not to appear as attorney and counsel for parties litiga-
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ting with her, in relation to her rights
or claims under the will, upon the
estate of her husband: Quinn v. Van
Pelt (1873), 36 N. Y. Super. Ct. 279.
The mayor of a city is not incompetent to act as its attorney: Niles v.
Muzzy (1875), 33 Mich. 61; and the
fact that an attorney, for clients having different interests, is enjoined for
one, does not restrain his acting for
others: Slater v. Merritt (1878), 75 N.
Y. 268. An attorney may act as commissioner to take a deposition in the
cause: Taylor v. Branch Bank (1848),
14 Ala. 633. The attorney for the
mortgagee in a foreclosure suit, may
appear also as attorney for a purchaser of the equity of redemption :
Wallace v. Furber (1878), 62 Ind.
103. One who acts as counsel for a
corporation, does not commit a breach
of trust if he afterwards acts as counsel in a proceeding against a director,
to recover money which the corporation has lost through a breach of the
director's official trust: Bent v. Priest
(1881), 10 Mo. App. 543. A commissioner to examine and allow claims
against an insolvent savings bank, is
not disqualified from acting as attorney for the assignee: Hall v. Bracket,
(1880), 60 N. H. 215. The fact that
an attorney is employed as an agent
to negotiate loans, does not preclude
him from rendering professional services to his principal: Union Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Buchanan (1884), 100
Ind. 63. In a New York case, a
lawyer was employed to, and did perform, certain services for a railroad
company, in which he was a stockholder, in procuring the release of a
mortgage upon its property, the surrender of certain of its bonds, the release of its liability on a contract, and
the extension of a land grant, and in
taking care of the surrendered bonds,
etc., etc. Held, that the fact that he
was a stockholder, did not preclude

him from sustaining the relation of
attorney to the railroad company, being retained and recovering for the
services in question : Barker v. Cairo,
etc. 1B. Co. (1874), 3 Th. & C. (N. Y.),
328. Statutes prohibiting a director
of a bank from acting as its attorney,
have been held constitutional: Walker
v. Am. Nat. Bank (1872), 49 N. Y.
659,; Dyer v. Sutherland (1874), 75
Ill. 583.
Effft of such conduct.-The effects of
the violation by the attorney of the
rule of law prohibiting him from ap
pearing on both sides of a case, or for
diverse interests, are threefold.
1. It is such error in the trial of the
cause in which the attorney appears,
that if not prevented by the trial
Court, will be good ground for a reversal on appeal; see the principal
case and Wilson v. State (1861), 16
Ind. 392.
2. It will prevent the attorney from
recovering his fees and charges for
his services. An attorney representing one party in a negotiation, will
not be allowed to receive compensation from the other party: De Celis v.
Brunson (1879), 53 Cal. 372; Orr v.
Tanner (1878), 12 R. 1.94. And this
rule was applied in an action on a note
given him by a husband, for services
to both parties to a divorce suit; the
payee, while attorney for the wife,
having, at his request, persuaded her
to dismiss the action; MacDonald v.
Wagner (1878), 5 Mo. App. 56. An
attorney employed to attend to certain
specified litigation "and to all other
litigations" concerning certain lands
under a contract, who accepts and
prosecutes an action for another
party, whose interests are adverse to
those of his employer, concerning the
same land, if discharged by the latter,
is not entitled to a specific performance of his contract with him: McArthur v. Fry (1872), 10 Kan. 233. A
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receiver cannot act as his own counsel, so as to charge the estate for his
services: Bank of Niagara Case
(1836), 6 Paige (N. Y.) 213; Adams
v. Woods (1857), 8 Cal. 321; [but a
trustee, who is an attorney, is entitled
to receive compensation for professional services rendered by him to the
trust estate, Perkins' Appeal (1885),
108 Pa. 314;] nor can one member
of a partnership, who is an attorney, charge the others for professional
services about the firm's affairs, either
before or after dissolution: Milburn
v. (Godd (1827), 7 'B. & C. 419 ; Vanduzer v. McMillan (1867), 37 Ga.
299 ; McCrary v. 2uddick (1871), 33
Iowa, 521; 'nor can an attorney, who
is a mortgagee, recover his costs, on
his own foreclosure: Sclater v. Cottam
(1857), 3 Jur. (N. S.), 630; Patterson
v. Donner (1874), 48 Cal. 369; nor
can a solicitor, who has an interest in
attending to a cause, charge for his services, without an express agreement:
Martin v. Campbell (1860), 11 Rich.
Eq. (S. C.) 205 ; see Deere v. Robinson
(1850), 7 Hare, 283. In New York, C.
an attorney-at-law, agreed for a stated
compensation, to conduct the contest
of a will. Against the consent of his
clients and without leave from them,
he released, as their attorney, pending the suit, certain tracts of land and
received from other parties money for
so executing the release. In a suit
brought by C. to recover the compensation agreed upon, the Court held
that these facts showed a complete defence to C.'s claim under the contract:
Clatfieldv. Simonson (1883), 92 N. Y.
209. So, in Connecticut, the plaintiff, a counsellor-at-law, instigated
the defendant with others, to engage
in a riot and promised to defend them,
if they were prosecuted. The defendant was prosecuted and employed the
plaintiff to defend him. The plaintiff
afterwards sued him for his services

and disbursements in defending him.
It was held that he could not recover :
Treat v. Jones (1859), 28 Conn. 334.
So, if an attorney, after having obtained final judgment and execution,
prevents the collection of the execution, by fraudulent conduct, this will
be in violation of his duty as attorney
and will deprive him of all legal claim
for his services in procuring such
a judgment and execution: Brackett
v. Norton (1823), 4 Conn. 517.
3. So, appearing on both sides of a
case or acting in diverse capacities, or
taking fees from both parties, has
been held to constitute a good ground
for the disbarment of the attorney:
Jackson v. State (1858), 21 Tex. 668;
In re Boman, St. Louis Ct. App.
(1879), 8 Cent. L. J. 250. In a Nebraska case, pending a writ of error in
the United States Supreme Court, in a
capital case, the prisoner's attorney
induced a United States commissioner
to believe that he had power to issue
a writ of habeas corpus and admit
the prisoner to bail, whereby he got
away. The attorney was dismissed from
the bar: State v. Burr (1886), 19 Neb.
593. In Minnesota, an attorney, in
whose hands a note had been placed
for collection, agreed with the maker,
without authority, that if she would
board his law partner, he would indorse the amount on the note. His
client repudiated this agreement, and
collected the full amount of the note
from the maker. The attorney never
accounted to his client for the amount
indorsed, and never repaid it to the
maker. The Court held that this was'
wilful professional misconduct: In re
Temple (1885), 33 Minn. 343. In
California, an attorney in 1874, as
district attorney, drew an indictment
which the grand jury returned as a
true bill.
In 1881, he appeared as
attorney for the defendant in the indictment. The Supreme Court held
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that he was thus guilty of a "violation of his duty as attorney," and
properly punished-no harm apparently having been intended-by three
months' suspension from practice:
People v. Spencer (1882), 61 Cal. 128.
In another case in the same State, one
C., who was city attorney, took appeals from judgments which had been
given in certain cases against the city,
which appeals were pending at the
expiration of his term of office ; after
the expiration of his term of office, he
asked one D., also an attorney, if a
certain point had been raised in his
cases. D. said "No," and in consideration that he would not be retained by said city to represent it in
either of said cases, paid to him one
hundred dollars; he agreed in consideration of such payment, and promised W. that he would not permit
himself to be retained in either of said
cases by the city. He performed no
professional or other services for this
payment and it was not expected that
he should. The Court held this professional misconduct, justifying his
disbarment: Re Cowdery (1886),69 Cal.
32. In a very recent case in the same
State, not yet reported, an accusation
that respondent urged a prosecution
for libel and promised to secure satisfactory evidence of the guilt of the defendant, and alleged that the Statute
of Limitations had not run, and, at
the examination, appeared for defendant and set up the Statute of Limitations and procured a writ of prohibition and defendant's discharge thereon, was held to show good ground for
disbarment: Inre Stephens, Cal. (1888).
In regard to such acts as the above, it

is not essential that it should be
shown, that the attorney committed
them wilfully, intentionally, and
knowing them to be wrong. As was said
In re Bowman, supra, "An attorney
committing them, was equally unfit to
practice law, whether he knew them
to be wrong or not. Who does not
know that it is wrong for an attorney
to take money on both sides ? If there
be any one who sincerely thinks that,
having done so, he is in a better condition to take an impartial view of the
matter in controversy, that he serves
his client better, by being also in the
service of the other side, and that it is
therefore no harm for him to be secretly
in pay of the enemy, or of the opponent,
he is a moral idiot. But a moral idiot
is not fit to practice law. No one is fit
to do so who does not understand that
there is no trust of a purely secular
character more sacred than that
created by the relation of attorney
and client." In a proceeding of this
character, the question is not necessarily as to the degree of moral turpitude; a case for disbarment may perhaps be imagined in which there
should be little or none. But in People v. Lanborn (1834), 2 Ill. 123, the
attorney had agreed to an entry of
judgment against his client. It was
held that having been specially employed to defend the suit, he had no
right to do this without the consent or
knowledge of his client. But, as it
did not appear that the client had a
legal defence, it was held that the motive might have been good and the
charge was not sustained.
JoHm D. LAwsox.
San Francisco, Cal.

